I. Introduction
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1 Terms 'immunity', 'leniency', or 'amnesty' are used in different regimes to describe similar instruments of competition law enforcement, allowing a firm participating in a prohibited practice to come forward and receive complete or partial immunity from sanctions in exchange for cooperation with the agency. In the US context it means complete immunity from criminal prosecution for the firm and its cooperating employees, or for the individual only (if she applies on her own). In other regimes, such as the EU, where there are no criminal sanctions, the term 'leniency' is more often used. It describes a possibility of having the fine (for participation in a prohibited agreement) either waived or partly reduced. Hence terms such as 'full immunity' or 'partial immunity', 'leniency'. 2 Terms 'antitrust' and 'competition law' are used in this article interchangeably. The same applies to terms 'antitrust agencies' and 'competition authority '. regard to operation of another cartel on an unrelated market. In exchange, the firm benefits not only from immunity in relation to its participation in the second cartel (under the leniency policy), but also from an additional reduction of sanctions for its involvement in the first investigated illegal practice (hence the 'plus'). As an instrument leniency plus is aimed at multimarket cartelists (firms operating on a single market cannot avail of it). As an element of a leniency programme, leniency plus should serve the same goals. It should help to destabilize, uncover and sanction existing prohibited agreements, and deter their creation.
The instrument was developed and is considered to operate successfully in the US. 3 The recent investigations of numerous auto parts cartels are reported to have been initiated thanks to leniency plus. 4 As it will be discussed, in the US this instrument is an integral and if applicable-compulsory (not optional) element of the leniency programme. It is often promoted as a tool having 'the potential to bring a series of cartels tumbling down like a house of cards.' 5 In recent years leniency plus-in various forms-was introduced in a number of jurisdictions.
6 Interestingly, it is not an element of the EU's leniency policy. 7 In some regimes, for example in Bulgaria, while existing on the books leniency plus has never been used. In at least one jurisdiction it has been removed from the toolbox a few years after its introduction. 8 International Competition Network's (ICN) Enforcement Manual mentions leniency plus as one of the less-frequently occurring elements of leniency programmes. 9 This article makes an original contribution by contextualising operation and rationale behind leniency plus, and by forewarning about its potential procollusive effects and the possibility of its strategic (mis)use by cartelists. It points to the limited use of the existing economic models, which focus on the interplay between firms and agencies and disregard the impact of criminal sanctions and leniency for individuals. This article offers also a comparison of leniency plus instruments in eleven jurisdictions. It mitigates optimism about leniency plus. It is claimed that while-from consumers' perspective-it may be a useful tool in some regimes, it is likely to be unnecessary or, worse, anticompetitive in other jurisdictions. This article argues that leniency plus tends to be a poorly transplanted US legal innovation. Policy-makers considering its addition to the enforcement toolbox should consider it in light of institutional limits and local realities. 3 The US Department of Justice (DoJ) Antitrust Division at various occasions reported that over half of its international cartel's investigations were initiated thanks to evidence obtained as a result of investigation of separate industries, or thanks to leads generated during such investigations. Yet 
II. Disclaimer re challenges and limits of comparing rules
When discussing leniency plus comparatively, one must keep in mind at least two differences between competition regimes. First, in some jurisdictions, especially in the US, antitrust violators face criminal sanctions. These are fines (for firms and individuals) and jail sentences. In fact, the US authorities are of the view that holding culpable individuals accountable, by seeking prison time, is the most effective way to deter and punish cartel activity. 10 Other regimes, in particular the EU, have no criminal sanctions and often no individual sanctions at all. Civil fines imposed on businesses are often the only price to be paid for breaches of competition law.
11 Second, those regimes which introduced individual sanctions allow individuals to apply for leniency on their own behalf (regardless of whether the firm had done so). 12 In jurisdictions not foreseeing individual sanctions, there is no individual leniency.
Both differences matter greatly. Threat of individual, especially criminal sanctions (if actively enforced 13 ) combined with a possibility of securing individual leniency changes the whistleblowing game. The moment individuals are able to avoid sanctions (especially the prospect of jail) leniency becomes more appealing-both for them individually and for firms (as they need to factor in a real possibility of independent individual applications, see Figure 1 below).
14 In such context, leniency plus may be a promising refinement of the enforcement system. In jurisdictions without individual sanctions and leniency, the situation is different. Cooperation with the authorities is more likely to be part of firm's strategic game (of playing off competitors or worse-the agency after reaping supra-competitive profits), since cartelists run a lesser risk of being uncovered (as there are no individual whistle-blowers acting under threat of sanctions, such as jail time, see Figure 2 below). From this perspective, introduction of leniency plus may be only adding further finesse to firms' strategic games. These two differences between competition regimes themselves make the comparative discussion of leniency plus challenging. They also remind us that a tool transplanted into different institutional frameworks may have different effects. Leniency plus originates from the US, where it is known under the name 'amnesty plus'. As a policy it began shaping in mid-1990s in the context of the investigations of international cartels. 15 It was formalised as an element of the leniency programme at the end of the 1990s.
III. Leniency plus in the US
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Under the US rules on amnesty plus 'the company can also receive a substantial additional reduction in its fine for its participation in the first offense (i.e., the offense to which the company is pleading guilty)'. 17 The level of the additional discount (the 'plus' reward) is not fixed. It depends on a number of factors. Relevant considerations are, in particular: 18 (1) the strength of the provided evidence, (2) the significance of the uncovered violation (in terms of the volume of commerce involved, the geographic scope, and the number of entities involved), and (3) the likelihood of the other conspiracy being uncovered without the voluntary disclosure. 19 The first two factors carry the greatest weight. 20 The fact that the scale of the additional reduction is not predefined in the US makes it more difficult for cartelists to use amnesty plus strategically. In the Crompton case-representing the high end of the reductions' spectrum-the firm, which is said to have provided 'exemplary cooperation', benefited from an 'extraordinary' 59% fine reduction (representing more than $70 million) under amnesty plus. 21 Crompton (later renamed Chemtura) was second-in-the-door (hence, unable to secure immunity from sanctions) in the context of the Antitrust Division's rubber chemicals international investigation. The firm conducted an internal investigation, which lead it to file for leniency on four other markets with combined annual US sales in hundreds of millions.
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Moreover, Crompton filed for and secured leniency in Canada and in the EU, what possibly enabled authorities to coordinate their enforcement efforts. The firm was also reported to have disciplined or terminated contracts with individuals involved in or aware of these agreements. It also introduced compliance programme, appointed an ethics and compliance officer, and rewrote its business conducts and ethics code.
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What is critical, amnesty plus is not a self-standing and optional instrument in the Antitrust Division's toolbox. It is an integral part of the leniency programme and an element of what can be referred to as a tripartite 'plus package'. This essential circumstance is surprisingly often disregarded in both legal and economic literature. The plus package includes also penalty plus and omnibus question instruments. Penalty plus is frequently referred to as flip side of amnesty plus, 24 or simply 'the 'stick' side to the amnesty plus carrot'. 25 If a firm cooperating with the agency does not avails of amnesty plus and does not disclose its participation in another prohibited agreement, and it gets later uncovered and prosecuted, the Division will urge the court to consider that failure-both on behalf of the firm and its executives-as an aggravating sentencing factor. 26 Hence, from design perspective amnesty plus and penalty plus are not only interlinked, but inseverable. Not availing of the first, should lead to severe consequences under the other. That said, the actual instances of penalty plus application are very rare or not well-reported. A recent case is that of Bridgestone Corporation, which agreed to plead guilty and pay a criminal fine of $425 million for price-fixing of certain auto parts. 27 The fine was significantly increased-under penalty plus-as Bridgestone was earlier involved in the marine hose cartel and although it pleaded guilty, 28 it had not revealed its participation in the auto parts cartel. 29 Noteworthy, Bridgestone decided to litigate in court rather than to settle with the DoJ. The only other reported case involving penalty plus is the one of Hoechst AG. In 2003 this German firm pleaded guilty and agreed to pay $12 million fine for participation in a hard-core cartel on the world markets for monochloroacetic acid (MCCAA). 30 The fine amounted to about 70% of the volume of affected commerce and it was about 30% above the maximum fine foreseen in the US Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, there executives were 'carved out' of the plea agreement. This upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines was the effect of penalty plus and recidivism. In 1990s the firm was involved in and convicted of price-fixing on another market. It did not disclose then its involvement in the anticompetitive conduct in relation to the MCCAA.
The third element of the plus package only adds to that dynamics. It is a proactive investigatory technique, now routinely used and referred to as the omnibus question. 31 At the end of an interview the investigators ask witnesses whether they are aware of any other prohibited practices. 32 Under US rules a cartelist is requited to inform the agency not only about another but about all other prohibited practices, in which it is involved. An individual would be subpoenaed and compelled to provide sworn testimony under the penalty of perjury, 33 which may include a fine and/ or a prison sentence of up to five years. 34 answering, or respond deceitfully without facing the threat of sanctions. Therefore the use of omnibus question reinforces the effectiveness of the amnesty-penalty plus by limiting the circumstances, in which prohibited agreements can remain undetected.
The leniency plus in the US is therefore a part of a broader plus package, which effectively raises the stakes on both ends of the reward-penalty spectrum. There is an extra carrot (leniency plus), but there is also an extra stick (the extra penalty). The omnibus question helps to limit the situations in which one can avoid the carrot-and-stick dilemma. 
IV. Concerns surrounding leniency plus
Thin theoretical underpinnings and an imminent threat
The US international cartels' investigations led to the development of leniency plus. Such cases were and remain particularly challenging, especially due to the fact that the evidence is often located abroad and domestic compulsory legal processes are of limited help. 35 Through this prism leniency and its further refinement-leniency plus may be seen as carrying a promise of enabling, what would be otherwise frequently impossible-an effective fight against foreign anticompetitive practices. Hence, it was rational for the US authorities to embrace leniency plus and formally add it to the enforcement toolbox. Yet, it is a practice and not theoryinformed instrument. Moreover, leniency plus is generally available and not only in the very specific subset of cases involving foreign entities.
Economists warrant that leniency plus can have adverse, procollusive effects. Its introduction can actually make cartels more, not less, stable. Dijkstra and Schoonbeek demonstrate that introduction of leniency plus may stabilize cartel formation; that some cartels will be formed, which would not exist under a regime without leniency plus. 36 Similarly, Lefouili and Roux, using a different model, show that leniency plus can make cartels sustainable in a wider range of circumstances and extend their duration; albeit it also increases firms' incentives to self-report after a first cartel detection.
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These models make a valuable contribution to our understanding of the potential consequences of the introduction of leniency plus. Unfortunately, while trying to inform the policy and looking into the US arrangement, they do not attempt to capture the full complexity of the US antitrust enforcement. These models focus on the interplay between firms and agencies, disregarding the important impact of criminal sanctions and leniency for individuals. Even that more limited analysis of the interactions between firms and agencies in the US context, overlooks penalty plus and omnibus question instruments, which change the incentives for firms and individuals. Where these features of the US system factored in, perhaps the overall conclusions on the effects of leniency plus would be different.
Yet, even these restricted models are useful. In many jurisdictions some features of the US system (eg criminal sanctions, individual leniency, penalty plus) are not present. This makes the theoretical findings of possible procollusive effects of leniency plus more directly relevant and suggests that policy-makers should be-at the very least-cautious when considering introduction of leniency plus and designing it. This is further warranted by the results of a recent, extensive practitioners' survey in the US showing that strategic use of leniency (for example, to punish competitors) is a significant phenomenon.
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Moral dilemma behind the 'plus'
From moral perspective leniency plus may be viewed as problematic. It is an additional reward for an entity which has participated in more than one prohibited agreement. In case of leniency, the waiver or the reduction of the sanction is a reward for full cooperation with the agency (including the provision of evidence). Given the difficulties involved in uncovering and dealing with cartels and the fact that leniency's introduction has a long-term effect of changing the market game (as its existence is another factor to be considered by any current and prospective violators), this reward may be viewed as justified.
In case of leniency plus, a violator benefits from leniency with regard to the other disclosed agreement. That is not problematic-that reward is justified on the just stated grounds. But what basis are there for granting the violator the additional-the 'plus'-reduction in relation to its participation in the firstly reported prohibited agreement? The violator does not provide any additional information (beyond that already provided under leniency). Should it be able to capitalize twice on the same 'service' rendered to the agency? It seems that the answer lies in the long-term impact of leniency plus. If it furthers distrust among current and prospective cartelists, if it additionally destabilizes cartels and helps prevent their creation, then perhaps the 'plus' is a fair price to pay for that long-term effect. Yet, since the economists suggest that it does not have to be so, that leniency plus may actually have procollusive effects, then this instrument poses a difficulty. Moreover, as discussed in the next section, leniency plus may also weaken deterrence.
The situation is perhaps somewhat mitigated when the additional reward under leniency plus is linked-as in the US system-with the additional penalty under penalty plus, and the practice of omnibus question. In such context, a cartelist has no choice-either it cooperates fully and discloses all prohibited agreements, or she faces greater sanctions for not having done so. The 'plus' reward can be seen then as a quid pro quo for coming completely clean. There is a value in it as fewer resources will be consumed to investigate firm's other possible, yet uncovered violations; and the signal will be sent to other market participants (including current and prospective cartelists) that that particular firm is no longer member of any prohibited agreement. Penalty plus is there in the background to act as a sanction for abusing this process of cooperating and coming clean. Such a more nuanced framework mitigates, if not fully solves, the moral dilemma behind leniency plus.
Systemic problems
Deterrence is one of the aims of competition law enforcement. To be effective, it should be based on a credible threat of sanctions of sufficient scale to exceed the benefits from engaging in a prohibited conduct. 39 The probability of detection and punishment must also be factored in. In regimes imposing only corporate fines for antitrust violations, 40 such as the EU, a minimum fine to deter anticompetitive conduct should 'equal the expected gains from the violation multiplied by the inverse of the probability of a fine being effectively imposed'. 41 In the context of collective violations, such as cartels, the same logic applies both to individual violators and the cartelists taken together. 42 Various commentators argue that fines currently imposed for antitrust violations are too low to secure optimal deterrence. 43 In jurisdictions relying only on fines, sub-optimal ones cause under-deterrence. Fines reductions under leniency programmes may weaken deterrence further, if they go beyond compensating increase in the probability of detection and successful 39 prosecution. 44 For example, Veljanovski showed that in the EU fines actually paid by violators were reduced by forty-five percent on average by leniency and he argues that the EU leniency programme 'appears over-generous'. 45 In such a context, the introduction of leniency plus has the potential to further weaken deterrence, possibly undermining the whole enforcement system, as it leads to the reduction of total sanctions imposed on a cartelist for its participation in prohibited agreements. It may lead to the worst possible outcome: society bearing the cost of competition law enforcement without a valid return in the form of reduced rate of collusion.
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V. Leniency plus-in whose interest?
As with all policies, also in the context of antitrust various groups, market participants lobby in their favour. In case of leniency plus some of the important stakeholders are multimarket firms, law firms, antitrust agencies, and consumers.
Since leniency plus is aimed at firms operating at more than one market, they are the principal stakeholder. It is rational to assume that most lobbying on their side-if any-will be in favour of poor leniency plus design, allowing firms to exploit it and use strategically for their own benefit. 47 Cartels are profitable so cartelists have funds necessary to attract skills and knowhow necessary to structure cartel involvement strategically, 48 in order to maximise supracompetitive profits, while minimising the firm's exposure to fines. Introduction of leniency plus may make this game only more elaborate. 49 Law firms, generally, are likely to lobby in favour of leniency plus in any serviceable form (that is, in a form which actually leads to some leniency plus applications), since a new instrument will likely create workload and hence billable hours. From law firms' workload perspective it does not matter whether the leniency plus regime is pro-or anticompetitive.
The true danger lies with the antitrust agencies. They may be tempted-but should notfavour leniency plus as a tool even if it is not good for consumers. Agencies care about their public relations and tend to act to justify their existence (and their budgets). They like to show the public at large that they are successful in performing their functions. 47 Firms which do not or did not partake in anticompetitive activities are more likely to focus on their core business and other regulatory lobbying (eg in the areas of corporate liability, IP protection, etc.), instead of investing scarce resources in trying to influence the design of new antitrust enforcement tools. 48 Cf n 38 above and text accompanying. 49 In similar vein Wils notes that 'successful cartels tend to be sophisticated organisations, capable of learning. It is thus safe to assume that cartel participants will try to adapt their organisation to leniency policy, not only so as to minimise the destabilising effect, but also, where possible, to exploit leniency policies to facilitate the creation and maintenance of cartels.' Wouter P. J. Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement (Oxford: Hart, 2008) para 422. 50 That is well illustrated by the antitrust agencies often recalling the cumulative amounts of imposed fines or jail sentences, which numbers are clearly intended to be perceived-and often sadly are-as a proxy of agency's effectiveness.
itself is poorly thought through, prone to strategic use by conspirators and actually contributing to consumer harm. Moreover, younger or less-established agencies may favour introducing leniency plus also because it may be presented-to the public, domestic and foreign counterparts-as a smart move. It may be advanced as a case of learning from the best practice of more experienced colleagues, arguably enhancing the reputation of the implementing agency.
Consumers should be in favour only of such leniency plus instruments which serve consumer welfare in the long term. Yet consumers, at large, do not represent their interests well. 51 The area of antitrust is particularly technical and one should not expect that consumers' positions will be well-represented in any dialogue on new policy proposals.
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VI. Leniency plus around the world
Although competition law enforcers and commentators often talk about cross-fertilisation between regimes, it seems that when one looks into the US system it seems that the fertilisation works one way-outwards, with US policies and practices are being exported, transplanted elsewhere. Leniency plus is one such example. After being developed in the US, in recent years it was introduced in various forms in other regimes.
The importance of rules design need not be explained to a legal audience. As will be discussed, in some regimes leniency plus was designed and implemented in ways which additionally (beyond the raised theoretical, moral and systemic concerns) question its effects and make it particularly prone to strategic use by cartelists. Therefore, it may often be a case of an unsuccessful or failed legal transplantation. 53 As discussed, in the US leniency plus is designed in such a way that a cartelist when applying for leniency is obliged to report not only one, but all prohibited agreements it is, or should be, aware of. By not doing so, it exposes itself to aggravated sanctions under penalty plus. Hence, leniency plus is a compulsory (not optional) part of the leniency programme. Due to the omnibus question practice, witnesses are asked about any prohibited agreements under the threat of sanctions for perjury. Since the cartelist is required to reveal all prohibited agreements, it is entitled to benefit from the additional, 'plus' reward only once. 54 The scale of the reward is not known ex ante. It is determined by the agency in the light of the relevant factors. Hence, the strategic use of the instrument is more difficult. Against this backdrop this article turns now to provide an overview of leniency plus rules in eleven jurisdictions which 51 Consumer groups tend to lack resources (as compared with business pressure groups), and they often have different viewpoints, making it difficult to secure adequate representation and exercise effective pressure on the policy-makers. See generally Colin Scott and Julia Black, Cranston's Consumers and the Law, 3rd ed. introduced it. 55 Brief insights into a few regimes which implemented leniency plus differently is followed by a more general comparison and commentary.
Canada
In Canada leniency plus is known under the name 'immunity plus'. Similarly to the US model, in Canada a cartelist is required to reveal to the Competition Bureau 'any and all' prohibited agreements it is aware of. 56 In case of failure to do so the Bureau may recommend increased penalties for the offences which should have been discovered by the applicant and disclosed. If the applicant knew about such offences but failed to report them, the Bureau will call for increased penalties and it may also move to revoke the immunity altogether. 57 The latter element makes the Canadian penalty plus policy stand out as the most stringent one internationally. Canada also embraced the US omnibus question practice. Witnesses are asked about any criminal activity they are aware of under a threat of criminal charge of obstruction under the Competition Act, 58 and perjury or obstruction under the Criminal Code. 59 The scale of the additional reduction under immunity plus is not predefined and is likely to be in the range of five to ten percent.
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UK
In the UK's regime an applicant for leniency does not have to disclose all prohibited agreements it is involved in. There are no penalty plus or omnibus question instruments. 61 In effect, leniency plus is only an optional element of the leniency programme. Moreover, a cartelists is presumably allowed to avail of it a few times in order to reduce sanctions for its involvement in the same prohibited agreement. 62 The UK's leniency plus is not particularly generous. The level of the additional reduction is not stipulated. The agency sets it in light of the circumstances, yet it is 'not likely to be high'. 63 That said, in at least one case the UK's agency granted an additional reduction of 25 percent under leniency plus. 64 
Switzerland
In Switzerland leniency plus is known under the name 'bonus plus'. It is an optional element of the leniency programme. An applicant for leniency, who did not qualify for immunity, may receive up to a 50 percent fine reduction. If she avails of leniency plus and discloses also another unknown cartel that reduction-enlarged thanks to leniency plus-may reach 80 percent, effectively setting a maximal leniency plus uplift at a level of 30 percent. 65 The leniency plus provisions were first time applied in 2010 with an applicant securing an overall (in total) discount of 60 percent.
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South Korea
In South Korea leniency plus is an option within the leniency programme. The size of the leniency plus reduction is determined by the size relation between the initially and later disclosed prohibited agreements. The baseline leniency plus reduction is 20 percent. If the other disclosed agreement (or agreements-the South Korean rules explicitly envisage a scenario in which a leniency plus applicant discloses more than one agreement) is bigger (in terms of turnover) than the initially reported agreement, yet not twice as big, the reduction is 30 percent. If the other agreement is more than twice bigger, but less than four times, the reduction is 50 percent. If it is four times bigger, the leniency plus warranties fine exemption (full reduction of the fine for participation in the initially reported agreement). 67 Given the generosity of South Korean leniency plus rules, they are particularly prone to strategic misuse by cartelists.
Poland
The 2014 Amendment Act 68 introduced leniency plus to Polish regime. 69 Leniency plus is an optional part of the leniency programme. The additional reduction is predefined and set rigidly at the very high level of 30 percent. The rules do not preclude also benefiting from the additional reduction multiple times with regard to the same fine. 6 Leniency plus was added to Italian regime only recently through Guidelines on antitrust fines, which were adopted in October 2014. See Linee Guida sulla modalità di applicazione dei criteri di quantificazione delle sanzioni amministrative pecuniarie irrogate dall'Autorità in applicazione dell'articolo 15, comma 1, della legge n. 287/90, para 24, available at <http://www.agcm.it/trasp-statistiche/doc_download/4498-lineeguidacriteriquantificazionesanzioni.html>. Table 1 provides an overview of the key features of the leniency plus instruments around the world. Only in the US-the jurisdiction which developed this instrument-and Canada leniency plus, if applicable, is a compulsory part of the leniency programme. In all other regimes it is an option-cartelists cooperating with an agency may, but are not required to avail of it. This is a first factor making it a tool susceptible to misuse. Moreover, in some jurisdictions in which leniency plus is an option the levels of the leniency plus reduction (the leniency plus uplift) were predefined. This in itself need not to be detrimental, but in some cases the uplifts are set in a rigid manner (stipulating a particular percentage rather than a reductions' range). For example, in Brazil and Poland the uplifts are set not only at very high levels (33 and 30%), but they are also unconditional in the sense that an applicant fulfilling the formal conditions will benefit from the reduction regardless of, for example, the significance of the other revealed prohibited agreement. Furthermore, in some of the regimes a cartelists may, explicitly or potentially, avail of a leniency plus uplift more than once, in order to reduce the same fine. This is particularly worrying, especially if one compares that construction with the US or Canadian solutions, requiring companies to come completely clean. 70 These last two design flaws may be exploited by multimarket cartelists. They may be engaging in more cartels, some of them also of little significance, in order to use them in future as tools lowering their exposure to fines for participation in more substantial prohibited agreements. These threats of potential misuse of leniency plus come on top of the earlier identified theoretical, moral, and systemic concerns relating to leniency plus, raising a serious question about the tool's design and the appropriateness of its introduction.
General comparison
VII. Conclusions
Leniency plus is an element of leniency programmes allowing a cartelist who did not secure a complete immunity to get an additional sanctions' reduction (the plus) in exchange for disclosing the agency some other prohibited agreement on an unrelated market. It is a practicebased tool, developed in the US in the context of international cartels investigations and considered by the US agency a successful instrument. Yet, economists show that leniency plus can have procollusive effects. Moreover, the instrument poses a moral dilemma as an additional reward is granted to multimarket firms which participated in more than one prohibited agreement.
In recent years leniency plus was transplanted into other jurisdictions. As argued in this piece these were in most cases only partial implementations. It seems that little attention was devoted to the instrument's place in the broader US plus package and the overall US antitrust enforcement system. While in the US leniency plus-when applicable-is compulsory (requiring firms to come completely clean under the threat of aggravated sanctions) in many other regimes it is an optional tool. Most jurisdictions introduced only the extra carrot (the additional reduction of sanctions) but no extra sticks (no penalties for not availing of it despite being involved in more cartels), leaving leniency plus prone to strategic misuse. Moreover, some regimes predefined the level of additional reductions and made it possible to use leniency plus multiple times in relation to the same underlying sanction. Such design flaws create incentives for multimarket firms to partake in more than one illegal agreements so as to game the system and avail of extra carrots (additional sanctions' reductions) if needs be. Hence, leniency plus becomes a tool potentially serving cartelists, not the consumers.
If properly designed leniency plus may be a useful tool in regimes with individual leniency and sanctions (especially of a criminal nature). Agencies which have the capacity and resources to robustly enforce competition laws, for example by challenging multimarket, often international cartelists, may put it to good use. In other regulatory frameworks and in regimes which enforcement priorities are different or resources are particularly scarce, policy-makers should abstain from introducing leniency plus as it can have procollusive effects, it may weaken deterrence, and could be exploited by cartelists. Authorities in such regimes will be better off by piggy-backing on the enforcement efforts of more resourceful, foreign counterparts. It is only rational for a multimarket cartelist which has applied for leniency, for example, in the US to file for leniency in other affected jurisdictions which actively enforce competition laws. It needs no further incentives such as further reductions of sanctions. These jurisdictions which added leniency plus to the enforcement toolboxes, but lack individual leniency and sanctions, should abandon it. 70 See also n 21 above.
